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A general proof of the security against eavesdropping of
a previously introduced protocol for two-party quantum key
distribution based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A
61, 052312 (2000)] is provided. In addition, the protocol is
extended to permit multiparty quantum key distribution and
secret sharing of classical information.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Bz
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement swapping (ES), that is, entangling a set
of particles S by appropriately projecting other parti-
cles previously entangled with particles of S [1–5], has
found a number of applications in quantum information:
constructing a quantum telephone exchange, speeding up
the distribution of entanglement, correcting errors in Bell
states, and preparing entangled states of a higher num-
ber of particles [3,5]. Recently, ES has also been used
to solve the problem of cryptographic key distribution
between two parties in an essentially new way [6]. In
this paper, the scheme of Ref. [6] is extended to per-
mit the distribution of the same key to several users
(multiparty key distribution), and to permit the distri-
bution of the same key to several users in such a way
that they must cooperate to obtain the key (secret shar-
ing of classical information). The structure of the paper
is the following: In Sec. II A the protocol for quantum
key distribution between two parties based on ES is re-
viewed. A general proof of its security is provided in
Sec. II B. Multiparty key distribution is introduced, and
a new protocol using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)
states [7] is presented in Sec. III A. In Sec. III B a differ-
ent approach, based on ES and which is a generalization
the two-party protocol, is introduced. Secret sharing is
treated in Sec. IV. Two previous protocols for secret
sharing using, respectively, GHZ and Bell states are re-
viewed in Secs. IVA and IVB. In Sec. IVC, it is shown
how the scheme of three-party key distribution based on
ES described in Sec. III B, also permits secret sharing.
The case of more than three users is treated in Sec. V.
Sec. VI is dedicated to demonstrate the security of ES-
based protocols against eavesdropping. Finally, the main
advantages of these protocols are summarized in Sec. VII.
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II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN
TWO PARTIES
A. The protocol based on entanglement swapping
The key distribution problem of cryptography is the
following: Alice wishes to convey a sequence of random
classical bits (a “key”) to Bob, while preventing that Eve
acquires information without being detected. This prob-
lem, which has no solution by classical means, can be
solved using quantum mechanics [8]. Indeed, subsequent
developments have shown that quantum mechanics pro-
vides different tools to solve the problem. Some are based
on the impossibility of cloning unknown nonorthogonal
quantum states [8,9], some also use entanglement be-
tween two particles [10,11], some combine quantum tech-
niques with classical private amplification and compres-
sion techniques [12], and some are based on splitting the
information in several qubits to which Eve has only a
sequential access [13–15]. In Ref. [6], a new method for
key distribution based on ES was introduced. Let us start
by briefly reviewing how this ES-based protocol works.
Consider the orthonormal basis of Bell states given by:
|00〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (1)
|01〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (2)
|10〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (3)
|11〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (4)
where
σz |0〉 = |0〉 , (5)
σz |1〉 = − |1〉 , (6)
being σz the corresponding Pauli spin matrix. For con-
venience, we shall divide the protocol in three parts:
(I) Preparation. Initially, Alice has four qubits: qubits
1 and 2, prepared in one public Bell state of the basis
(1)-(4), and qubits 3 and 5, prepared in another Bell
public state of the same basis. Bob, in a distant place,
has two qubits, 4 and 6, prepared in a public Bell state
of the same basis. For example, the initial state of the
six qubits can be
|ΨI〉 = |00〉12 ⊗ |00〉35 ⊗ |00〉46 . (7)
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Next, Alice sends qubit 2 out to Bob through an insecure
quantum channel (i.e., Eve can manipulate qubit 2).
(II) Generation of two bits of the key. Alice performs
a complete Bell-state measurement on qubits 1 and 3
(henceforth referred to as Alice’s secret measurement).
The result, AS (a random number: “00” if the result is
|00〉, “01” if it is |01〉, “10” if it is |10〉, or “11” if it is
|11〉), defines two bits of the key. Then, the state is
|ΨII〉 = |AS〉13 ⊗ |AS′〉25 ⊗ |00〉46 , (8)
where |AS′〉 is a Bell state which is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with |AS〉.
(III) How Bob obtains the two bits of the key. Bob per-
forms a complete Bell-state measurement on qubits 2 and
4 (henceforth referred to as Bob’s secret measurement),
and keeps the result, BS, secret. After that, the state is
|ΨIII〉 = |AS〉13 ⊗ |BS〉24 ⊗ |AP 〉56 , (9)
where |AP 〉 is a Bell state which can be determined from
the pair AS, BS. Then, Bob sends qubit 6 out to Alice
(i.e., Eve can manipulate qubit 6). Finally, Alice per-
forms a complete Bell-state measurement on qubits 5 and
6 (henceforth referred to as Alice’s public measurement),
and publicly announces the result, AP , through a clas-
sical channel (which is assumed to be public but which
cannot be altered) [16]. Due to the successive ES be-
tween the pairs of qubits, for each of the four possible
values of AP , there is a different one-to-one correspon-
dence between the results of Alice’s and Bob’s secret mea-
surements. These correspondences are compiled in Table
I. Therefore, once Bob knows the AP , he can infer AS.
The process must be sequentially repeated until the key
is large enough.
B. Security of the protocol based on ES
In Ref. [6], the security against eavesdropping of the
protocol for two-party key distribution based on ES was
showed for a particular eavesdropping attack. Here I will
provide a general (i.e., attack-independent) proof.
The result AS defines two bits of the key. However,
AS is random and Eve cannot influence it by manipu-
lating any of the transmitted qubits. To obtain AS, Eve
needs the same two ingredients as Bob: BS and AP . In
addition, to avoid being detected, Eve needs to obtain
BS without changing AP . However, since Eve has only
access to two of the six qubits, we shall see that any pro-
cedure that allows Eve to obtain BS, changes AP in an
unpredictable way. Let us examine the strategies that
Eve can follow and their consequences.
In step (I) of the protocol, the only qubit accessible
to Eve is qubit 2. If Eve’s aim is to obtain BS (as a
previous step to obtain AS), the only useful strategy is
one whose result is equivalent to capturing qubit 2 and
substituting it by an ancillary qubit 8 (which will be sent
out to Bob), which was previously prepared in a Bell state
(for instance |00〉
78
) with another ancillary qubit 7 (which
will be retained by Eve) [17]. After this manœuvre the
state of the qubits is
|Ψ′I〉 = |00〉12 ⊗ |00〉35 ⊗ |00〉46 ⊗ |00〉78 , (10)
where Alice has qubits 1, 3, and 5; Bob has qubits 4,
6, and 8; and Eve has qubits 2 and 7. This situation is
illustrated in Fig. 1 (a1). The corresponding situation
in the alternative scenario in which Eve is not present is
illustrated in Fig. 1 (b1).
In step (II), Alice performs her secret measurement on
qubits 1 and 3, and Bob performs his secret measurement
on qubits 4 and 8 (which substitutes qubit 2). After these
measurements the state of the qubits is
|Ψ′II〉 = |AS〉13 ⊗ |AS′〉25 ⊗ |BS′〉67 ⊗ |BS〉48 , (11)
where |AS〉 is the Bell state which defines two bits of the
key, |AS′〉 is a Bell state in one-to-one correspondence
with |AS〉, |BS〉 is the Bell state which gives Bob’s se-
cret result BS, and |BS′〉 is a Bell state in one-to-one
correspondence with |BS〉. This situation is illustrated
in Fig. 1 (a2). The corresponding situation in the alter-
native scenario in which Eve is not present is illustrated
in Fig. 1 (b2).
In the step (III), Bob sends qubit out 6 to Alice. This
allows Eve to capture it and obtain BS by performing a
Bell-state measurement on qubits 6 and 7 (the result BS′
of this measurement is in one-to-one correspondence with
BS). This is (modulo equivalencies) the only strategy
that allows Eve to obtain BS. Now, to obtain AS, she
still needs to know AP (which must be in one-to-one
correspondence with the pair AS, BS). However, Eve’s
intervention has changed the state of the qubits (compare
|ΨII〉 with |Ψ′II〉).
Before Alice’s public measurement, Eve has access to
qubit 2 (which is in a Bell state, unknown to Eve, with
Eve’s qubit 5), and to qubits 6 and 7. If Eve manages
to give Alice a qubit in the Bell state |AP 〉 with qubit 2,
then her intervention won’t be detected. Eve can prepare
a qubit in any desired Bell state with qubit 2; the problem
is that she does not know which is the “correct” Bell
state. Indeed, she cannot know which is the right one
since this would require Eve to know |AS〉
13
(and Eve
has no access to qubits 1 and 3), or |AS′〉
25
(and Eve only
has access to qubit 2, and since the partial trace of all
the Bell states is the identity matrix, any measurement
on one qubit cannot reveal anything about the state of
both qubits).
Alternatively, if Eve gives to Alice qubit 6 (or 7), then
the result of Alice’s public measurement will allow Eve
to obtain AS′ (and therefore AS). However, this result is
not in one-to-one correspondence with the pair AS, BS
anymore. Therefore, the result obtained by Alice will be
the “wrong” one in 3
4
of the runs, and thus Eve’s inter-
vention can be detected when Alice and Bob compare
subsets of their keys.
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Summing up, no strategy allows Eve to extract infor-
mation without being detected, because the only strategy
that Eve can use to obtain information will change the
expected result for AP in 3
4
of the cases. In addition, this
proves that one of the interesting features of the proto-
col based on ES —namely, that it improves the efficiency
of the detection of eavesdropping compared with other
protocols [6]— is independent of the attack.
III. MULTIPARTY KEY DISTRIBUTION
A. Multiparty key distribution using two GHZ states
Consider the following problem: Alice wishes to con-
vey the same key to N users (Bob, Carol,. . . , Nathan),
while preventing Eve from acquiring information with-
out being detected. This problem, called multiparty key
distribution, is a special case of networked cryptographic
conferencing [18,19].
Here I introduce a protocol for using GHZ states for
multiparty quantum key distribution that, as far as I
know, has not been presented anywhere before. It can
be considered as a generalization to many parties of the
two-party protocol of Ref. [10].
Let us focus our attention in the case N = 3 (the
cases with N > 3 are straightforward extensions of this
case). Alice wishes to distribute the same key to Bob
and Carol. For that purpose, she randomly prepares one
of the following two three-qubit GHZ states:
|ψz〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |0〉k +
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (12)
|ψx〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0¯〉i ⊗ |0¯〉j ⊗ |0¯〉k +
|1¯〉i ⊗ |1¯〉j ⊗ |1¯〉k), (13)
where
σx |0¯〉 = |0¯〉 , (14)
σx |1¯〉 = − |1¯〉 , (15)
being σx the corresponding Pauli spin matrix. Then Al-
ice sends one of the three qubits out to Bob, another to
Carol, and retains the third one. Bob and Carol perform
a measurement of either σz or σx on their own qubit.
When Alice has prepared the state |ψz〉 (|ψx〉), and both
Bob and Carol have measured σz (σx) —i.e., in
1
4
of the
cases—, all of them obtain the same result. In that case,
they can use this result to define one bit of the key. The
other cases are not useful for establishing a common key
and are rejected. Alternatively, to reduce the wastage of
qubits due to the noncoincidence of the measurements,
Alice can tell Bob and Carol which is the “right” mea-
surement (once all three qubits are safe from Eve’s in-
tervention). The security of this scheme against eaves-
dropping is guaranteed by the impossibility of cloning an
unknown state chosen between |ψz〉 and |ψx〉, specially
when Eve only has access to two of the three qubits.
B. Multiparty key distribution based on
entanglement swapping
A different multiparty key distribution protocol can be
obtained using ES. Indeed, what follows is just one of the
possible generalizations to three parties of the protocol
for key distribution between two parties based on ES of
Ref. [6].
Consider the orthonormal basis of GHZ states given
by:
|000〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |0〉k +
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (16)
|001〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |0〉k −
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (17)
|010〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |1〉k +
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |0〉k), (18)
|011〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |1〉k −
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |0〉k), (19)
|100〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |0〉k +
|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (20)
|101〉ijk =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |0〉k −
|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (21)
|110〉ijk =
1√
2
(|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |0〉k +
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |1〉k), (22)
|111〉ijk =
1√
2
(|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ |0〉k −
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ |1〉k). (23)
The protocol can be summarized in four steps, which are
illustrated in Fig. 2:
(i) Initially, Alice has qubits 1 and 2, prepared in one
public Bell state of the basis (1)-(4), and qubits 3, A, and
B (qubits described by numbers stay with the same user
during all the protocol, and qubits described by letters
are transmitted between users during the protocol) pre-
pared in a GHZ state of the basis (16)-(23). Bob (Carol),
in a distant place, has two qubits, 5 and D (4 and C),
prepared in a public Bell state. For instance, the initial
state of the nine qubits can be
|ψi〉 = |000〉3AB ⊗ |00〉12 ⊗ |00〉5D ⊗ |00〉4C , (24)
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where subindexes 3, A, etc., mean qubits 3, A, etc.
(ii) Then, Alice sends qubit A (B) out to Bob (Carol)
through an insecure quantum channel. Next, Alice per-
forms a secret Bell-state measurement on qubits 2 and 3,
Bob performs a secret Bell-state measurement on qubits
5 and A, and Carol performs a secret Bell-state measure-
ment on qubits 4 and B.
(iii) After these three secret measurements, the state
of qubits 1, C, and D becomes a GHZ state of the basis
(16)-(23), due to multiparticle ES [3]. The final state is
|ψiii〉 = |AP 〉1CD ⊗ |AS〉23 ⊗ |BS〉5A ⊗ |CS〉4B . (25)
(iv) Then, Bob (Carol) sends qubit D (C) out to Al-
ice, who performs a complete GHZ-state measurement
on qubits 1, C, and D [i.e., a measurement which un-
ambiguously discriminates between states (16)-(23)], and
publicly announces the result through a classical channel.
Out of the 512 possible combinations of results (for Al-
ice’s public measurement, and Alice’s, Bob’s, and Carol’s
secret measurements), there are only 64 which have a
nonzero probability to occur. If the initial state is (24),
these 64 combinations are represented in Table II. All of
them have the same probability to occur ( 1
64
).
The secret key that Alice, Bob, and Carol will share is
defined as the first bit of Alice’s secret measurement. As
a close examination of Table II reveals, Bob (or Carol)
can infer Alice’s first bit using just two ingredients: the
result of the public measurement, and the result of his
(her) own secret measurement. Therefore, once Bob
(Carol) knows the result of the public measurement, he
(she) can infer the first bit of the result of Alice’s secret
measurement. The process can be sequentially repeated.
IV. QUANTUM SECRET SHARING OF
CLASSICAL INFORMATION
A. Hillery-Buzˇek-Berthiaume secret sharing using
GHZ states
Consider the following problem: Alice wishes to con-
vey a key to Bob and Carol in such a way that none
of them can read it on their own, only if they collabo-
rate. In addition, they wish to prevent that Eve acquires
information without being detected. This is an interest-
ing problem in the following scenario [20]: Alice wants to
have a secret action taken on her behalf in a distant part.
There she has two agents, Bob and Carol, who carry it
out for her. Alice knows that one and only one of them is
dishonest, but she does not know which one. She cannot
simply send a secure message to both of them, because
the dishonest one will try to sabotage the action, but she
knows that if both carry it out together, the honest one
will keep the dishonest one from doing any damage.
A first solution to this problem using quantum tools
was provided in Ref. [20], and can be summarized as fol-
lows: Alice prepares three qubits in the GHZ state given
by Eq. (12), and sends one qubit out to Bob, another
to Carol, and keeps the third. Bob and Carol indepen-
dently and randomly choose whether to measure σx or
σy on their qubits. They then publicly announce which
measurement they have made, but not which result they
have obtained. If Bob and Carol have chosen the same
measurement, they can then determine what was the re-
sult of Alice’s measurement by combining their results.
This allows Alice, Bob, and Carol to establish a common
key. The other events in which Bob and Carol have cho-
sen different measurements (which are 1
2
of the events)
do not allow them to make useful inferences to estab-
lish a key and are therefore rejected. For details on this
protocol and for proofs of its security see [20,21].
B. Karlsson-Koashi-Imoto secret sharing using Bell
states
In Ref. [21] another protocol for secret sharing using
Bell states instead of GHZ states is proposed. It works as
follows: Alice prepares two qubits in one of the following
four states:
∣∣ψ+〉
ij
=
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
=
1√
2
(
|0¯〉i ⊗ |0¯〉j − |1¯〉i ⊗ |1¯〉j
)
, (26)
∣∣φ−〉
ij
=
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
=
1√
2
(
|0¯〉i ⊗ |1¯〉j + |1¯〉i ⊗ |0¯〉j
)
, (27)
∣∣Ψ+〉
ij
=
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0¯〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |1¯〉j
)
=
1√
2
(
|0¯〉i ⊗ |0〉j + |1¯〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (28)
∣∣Φ−〉
ij
=
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1¯〉i − |1〉i ⊗ |0¯〉j
)
=
1√
2
(
|0¯〉i ⊗ |1〉j − |1¯〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (29)
and sends out one of the qubits to Bob and the other
to Carol. They independently and randomly perform a
measurement of either σz or σx. Then Bob and Carol
have a public discussion where they declare the mea-
surement outcomes for a subset of bits used for testing
eavesdropping. It is essential that this discussion takes
place before any further declaration. If they do not de-
tect eavesdropping, Bob publicly declares the outcomes
of his measurements (but not yet his choice of measure-
ments), then Carol declares both her choice of measure-
ments and the corresponding outcomes, and finally Bob
declares his choice of measurements (the order of the dec-
larations is important to preserve security). Then, Al-
ice publicly reveals whether she has prepared one of the
states {|ψ+〉 , |φ−〉}, or one of the states {|Ψ+〉 , |Φ−〉}
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(but not which specific state she has prepared). If Alice
has prepared a state of the first (second) set, then the
results of Bob’s and Carol’s local measurements are cor-
related only if both have chosen to measure σz or both
have chosen to measure σx (if one of them has chosen
to measure σz and the other has chosen to measure σx).
Such correlations allow Bob and Carol to find out which
state Alice has prepared. But this is only possible if both
cooperate. Note that in this protocol, in half of the events
there is no correlation between Bob’s and Carol’s results
so half of the events are not useful for secret sharing and
must be rejected.
C. Secret sharing using entanglement swapping
In Sec. III B we saw how to distribute one bit between
three users employing ES between two-qubit Bell states
and three-qubit GHZ states. In this section we show that
the scenario described there also allows secret sharing of
classical information. The protocol for secret sharing has
steps (i) to (iii) in common with the protocol of multi-
party key distribution described in Sec. III B. In step
(iv), we saw that once Bob (Carol) knows the result of
the public measurement, he (she) can infer the first bit
of the result of Alice’s secret measurement. In addition,
as a close inspection of Table II shows, once Bob (Carol)
knows the result of Carol’s (Bob’s) secret measurement,
he (she) can infer the second bit of the result of Alice’s
secret measurement. That is, if Bob and Carol cooper-
ate they can infer this second bit. Therefore, the same
scenario allows us to develop a protocol for multiparty
key distribution and, simultaneously, a protocol for se-
cret sharing.
V. ES-BASED PROTOCOL FOR MULTIPARTY
KEY DISTRIBUTION AND SECRET SHARING
BETWEEN MORE THAN THREE USERS
Both the scheme for multiparty key distribution based
on ES, described in Sec. III B, and the scheme for secret
sharing described in Sec. IVC, can be extended to N
users as follows:
(i) Every user has a pair of qubits in a public Bell
state. In addition, Alice has another N qubits prepared
in a GHZ state of the orthonormal basis:
|00...0〉ij...N =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉N +
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |1〉N ), (30)
|00...1〉ij...N =
1√
2
(|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉N −
|1〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |1〉N ), (31)
...
|11...0〉ij...N =
1√
2
(|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉N +
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |1〉N ), (32)
|11...1〉ij...N =
1√
2
(|1〉i ⊗ |0〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |0〉N −
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j ⊗ ...⊗ |1〉N ). (33)
For instance, consider that the initial state of the system
is
|Ψi〉 = |00...0〉 ⊗ |00〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |00〉 . (34)
(ii) Then, Alice sends a qubit of her GHZ state out to
each of the other N − 1 users. Next, each user (including
Alice) performs a Bell-state measurement on the received
qubit and one of their qubits.
(iii) After these measurements the state of the system
becomes
|Ψiii〉 = |AP 〉 ⊗ |AS〉 ⊗ |BS〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |NS〉 , (35)
where |AP 〉 is a N -qubit GHZ state of the basis (30)-
(33), and the ordering of the qubits is not the same as in
|Ψi〉 (as occurs in Secs. II A and III B).
(iv) Then, the N − 1 users sends a qubit (the one they
have no used) to Alice, and she performs a measurement
to discriminate between the 2N GHZ states (30)-(33),
and publicly announces the result. This result AP , and
the result of their own secret measurement allow each
legitimate user to infer the first bit of Alice’s secret result
AS. To find out the second bit of AS, all users (except
Alice) must cooperate. For instance, in case there are
four users (Alice, Bob, Carol, and David), to obtain the
second bit of AS it is not enough that Bob and Carol
share their secret results. As Table III shows, they also
need to know David’s secret result.
VI. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOLS BASED
ON MULTIPARTICLE ES
The proof of the security against eavesdropping of the
protocols for multiparty key distribution and secret shar-
ing based on multiparticle ES is parallel to the one de-
veloped in Sec. II B for the protocol for two parties key
distribution. The guidelines of the proof are the follow-
ing:
AS (whose first bit defines the part of the key that
the legitimate users can obtain without cooperating, and
whose second bit defines the part of the key that the users
can obtain if they cooperate) is a random number, and
Eve cannot do anything to change or influence it.
In order to obtain the first (second) bit of AS, Eve
needs the same ingredients that any legitimate user
needs: the result of the secret measurement of one (all)
of them, and AP .
Any attempt to find out one of the secret results will
change the result AP in an unpredictable way. There-
fore, Eve’s presence can be detected. Indeed, detecting
Eve requires the comparison of fewer bits than in other
protocols since the probability that the result AP is a
“wrong” one is 2
N
−1
2N
, being N the number of users.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of this paper has been to introduce new
protocols for multiparty key distribution and secret shar-
ing of classical information. The main interest of the
protocols based on ES is that they provide a conceptu-
ally different way to solve certain problems of informa-
tion theory. Its main advantages are that no transmitted
quantum data are rejected, so they improve the efficiency
of previous protocols; and that the detection of Eve re-
quires the comparison of fewer bits, since the probability
that Eve alters the result expected by the legitimate users
is higher. On the other hand, since these protocols in-
volve complete Bell-state and GHZ-state discriminations,
they are much more difficult to perform in practice than
previous protocols based on simpler measurements.
In this paper we have focused our attention in the dis-
tribution of classical information. However, as occurs
with previous proposals, the protocols presented here can
also be used, with little modifications, to distribute quan-
tum information [3,20] and for secret sharing of quantum
information [20–23].
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Public Alice Bob Public Alice Bob
00 00 00 10 00 10
” 01 01 ” 01 11
” 10 10 ” 10 00
” 11 11 ” 11 01
01 00 01 11 00 11
” 01 00 ” 01 10
” 10 11 ” 10 01
” 11 10 ” 11 00
TABLE I. The 16 possible combinations of results of Alice’s
public Bell-state measurement, and Alice’s and Bob’s secret
Bell-state measurements on the initial state given by Eq. (7).
Public Alice Bob Carol Public Alice Bob Carol
000 00 00 00 100 00 00 10
” ” 01 01 ” ” 01 11
” 01 00 01 ” 01 00 11
” ” 01 00 ” ” 01 10
” 10 10 10 ” 10 10 00
” ” 11 11 ” ” 11 01
” 11 10 11 ” 11 10 01
” ” 11 10 ” ” 11 00
001 00 00 01 101 00 00 11
” ” 01 00 ” ” 01 10
” 01 00 00 ” 01 00 10
” ” 01 01 ” ” 01 11
” 10 10 11 ” 10 10 01
” ” 11 10 ” ” 11 00
” 11 10 10 ” 11 10 00
” ” 11 11 ” ” 11 01
010 00 10 00 110 00 10 10
” ” 11 01 ” ” 11 11
” 01 10 01 ” 01 10 11
” ” 11 00 ” ” 11 10
” 10 00 10 ” 10 00 00
” ” 01 11 ” ” 01 01
” 11 00 11 ” 11 00 01
” ” 01 10 ” ” 01 00
011 00 10 01 111 00 10 11
” ” 11 00 ” ” 11 10
” 01 10 00 ” 01 10 10
” ” 11 01 ” ” 11 11
” 10 00 11 ” 10 00 01
” ” 01 10 ” ” 01 00
” 11 00 10 ” 11 00 00
” ” 01 11 ” ” 01 01
TABLE II. The 64 possible combinations of results of Alice’s
public GHZ-state measurement, Alice’s, Bob’s, and Carol’s
secret Bell-state measurements on the initial state given by
Eq. (24).
Public Alice Bob Carol David
0000 00 00 00 00
” ” 00 01 01
” ” 01 00 01
” ” 01 01 00
” 01 00 00 01
” ” 00 01 00
” ” 01 00 00
” ” 01 01 01
” 10 10 10 10
” ” 10 11 11
” ” 11 10 11
” ” 11 11 10
” 11 10 10 11
” ” 10 11 10
” ” 11 10 10
” ” 11 11 11
TABLE III. The 16 possible combinations of results of Al-
ice’s, Bob’s, Carol’s, and David’s secret Bell-state measure-
ments on the initial state |0000〉⊗|00〉⊗|00〉⊗|00〉⊗|00〉, if the
result of Alice’s public four-qubit GHZ-state measurement is
“0000”.
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BobEve
2
4
6
1
3
5
Alice Bob
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(a2) (b2)
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Alice Bob
FIG. 1: (a1) and (a2) represent two steps of the protocol for
two-party key distribution based on ES, assuming that Eve
wants to obtain the result of Bob’s secret measurement. (a1)
represents the situation before Alice’s and Bob’s secret mea-
surements, and (a2) the situation after these measurements.
(b1) and (b2) represent, respectively, the same two steps, (a1)
and (a2), but assuming that Eve is not present. Bold lines
connect qubits in Bell states.
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FIG.. 2: The four steps of the three-party key distribution
protocol based on ES. The notation is the same introduced
in Ref. [3]: triangles connect qubits in GHZ states, bold lines
connect qubits in Bell states, and dashed lines represent Bell-
state measurements.
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